Meyer's Mistake

Columbus, Ohio is my home. I love it: the atmosphere, the people, the relatively flat roads, and the culture that The Ohio State University infuses into, not only the city, but the state too. That is why the news that broke this week was, at the very least, embarrassing and, at the very most, a black mark on Columbus.

Most of the headlines read, “Urban Meyer Fires Wide Receiver Coach, Zach Smith, After Smith Received Restraining Order.” My initial reaction was that of amazement because a high profile college football coach actually took proactive measures in dismissing an obvious distraction to the team and an even larger danger to society. Unfortunately that was my “initial” reaction.

In less than a few hours new reports were being released that Zach Smith, the Ohio State wide receivers coach, had an apparent history of run ins with the police, spurring from domestic violence allegations. It was even more disturbing to learn that Smith’s disturbances each occurred while he was working for Meyer.

Dating back to 2009, while Smith was married to his wife and coaching for Meyer at the University of Florida, police were called out to Smith’s home after Smith returned home with a female co-worker. It was alleged that when Smith returned home with the female co-worker, an argument ensued between him and his wife and allegedly Smith placed his hands on his wife. The domestic violence charges were eventually dropped.

Meyer, when questioned this week about the 2009 incident, stated that he was aware of “a” 2009 incident involving Smith, but was not aware of those details stated in the police record. Meyer was sure to mention that when he became aware of the ’09 incident that he immediately went to his boss and asked how to handle. It was determined that Smith was to seek counseling.

In 2015, while Smith was working for Meyer at Ohio State, the Powell, Ohio police were called to his ex- wife’s residence on two separate occasions. The first occasion was for a domestic violence claim and the second had to do with an alleged stalking claim. On both occasions Smith’s ex-wife called the police and on both occasions the Powell Police confirmed that Smith was their main suspect. However, charges were never filed on either occasion.

Meyer, again when questioned this week about the 2015 incident, stated that he was not aware of the 2015 incidents. Finally, Meyer did acknowledge past allegations that had been publicized about Smith this week were a factor in issuing his termination.

The first question to resolve is whether Meyer is negligent? However, the question should be: “in what ways could Meyer be negligent?”

To the latter question there are two obvious ways that Meyer is negligent. The first, and the more detrimental case of negligence, is that Meyer knew about all of Smith’s claims while Smith was employed under Meyer, and yet Meyer did not perform his duty as a head football coach of a public learning institution. This claim of negligence does not seem possible. First, unlike Penn State, in which there was direct evidence at the university that crimes were being committed, here, Meyer did not have any direct evidence that Smith was committing domestic violence. In fact, in the 2009 incident, Meyer reported what he knew to his boss. A disciplinary action was then handed down to Smith. In the case of the 2015 incidents, Meyer claims to be unaware of those occasions.  Typically, this excuse of “being unaware” holds little water in college football, but Powell Police reported that because no charges were filed, they did not list Smith’s name as the suspect in their report. In turn, Meyer wouldn’t have known of Smith’s actions, especially if the police did not make any charges.

The second form of negligence, and one that is more common in prominent college athletic programs but harder to discern, is one in which the head coach failed to perform his duty to ensure a respectable level of discipline in his locker room. In other words, because the coach is so focused on winning, he is failing to ensure that players/coaches are aware of the consequences of their off the field actions. The reason why this form of negligence seems to be possible, with Meyer is because Meyer’s past programs, mainly Florida, are littered with players committing or being charged with egregious criminal acts. A 2013 New York Time article, by Greg Bishop, discussing Meyer’s Gator players and their lack of discipline stated, “[m]any of the charges were typical of college campuses . . . But other, more serious charges included aggravated stalking, domestic violence by strangulation, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and fraudulent use of credit cards, according to criminal record databases. . ..” It was further reported that in Meyer’s career at Florida (2005-2010), his players were arrested 31 times. At one point a former player of Meyer’s, Janoris Jeinkins, who was dismissed from Florida by Meyer’s successor, stated that, “[i]f Coach Meyer were still coaching, I’d still be playing for the Gators. Coach Meyer knows what it takes to win.”

The aforementioned examples provide evidence that either Meyer’s players show no regard for consequences, which may be right as some of them were alleged to have committed terrible acts. However, if this is the case, it would seem just as likely or prominent, that most football universities would have the same issues, or at least at a similar rate of frequency. On the other hand, it may be that these players do not fear consequences because either the internal consequences (i.e. football consequences) are not adequately communicated to them, so they are not put on notice, or the possible sanctions fail to provide a sufficient deterrence from engaging in criminal behavior. The latter version is similar to a corporation that weighs paying a fine with the potential profits from not following a rule. If the profits are more than the cost of the fine, then it would make economic sense to move forward with breaking the rule and paying the fine. The fine would be considered simply as a “cost of doing business.”

So the claim is essentially that Meyer is failing in his duty, as head football coach, to ensure that he has a reasonably respectable football program. In other words, not only does Meyer have a “duty” to win, but as a public figure for a world renowned institution of knowledge, he has an equally important, if not more important, duty to ensure players are acting correctly.  If they are not, that they are disciplined with a reasonable consequence.

So this form of negligence may be transcending beyond the players to include the coaches that Meyer supervises. For instance, it is hard to conceive that the 2009 charges filed against Smith, and subsequently dropped, were somehow not accurately provided to Meyer. If Meyer was aware of the exact facts of the 2009 incident, would Smith have been dismissed then? (Please remember, although not the NCAA, the NFL had no problem giving Ezekiel Elliot a six game suspension even after no charges were even filed).

No matter what, this form of negligence will persist in football so long as coaches continue to get exorbitantly paid. In other words, the more coaches keep getting paid a lot of money, the more they win. This formula ferments pressure on coaches to win at all costs. This pressure causes internal mistakes to be made, questionable character traits not to be questioned, and blemishes to be quickly covered up or washed away. In other words, because there is such a high demand from the university for the coach to satisfy his “duty” to win, that the coach fails in his other “duty” to lead. So yes, Coach Meyer does “know what it takes to win,” but every other successful college football coach “knows what it takes to win” too. It’s a matter of whether Coach Meyer knows what it takes to lead.

Hader's Hate, and Milwaukee's Miscue

Josh Hader has come in the headlines not for his accomplishment in becoming an all-star relief pitcher for the Milwaukee Brewers, but for his racist and homophobic tweets.  He published these tweets, which have come to light recently, when he was a teenager (2011 and 2012). To be clear, these tweets were wrong, horrifying and disturbing. Hader’s punishment, handed by the MLB as the Brewers will not issue a punishment, is that he must attend “sensitivity training and attend diversity initiatives.” Further, Hader has apologized publicly and privately cried to his teammates. Many of Hader’s teammates, past and present, have also come to his side, saying they never saw any sort of racist or homophobic behavior (many of these players were minorities).  Finally, in Hader’s first appearance on the mound since the racist tweets came to national attention, the Milwaukee Brewer fans (who were almost all white) gave Hader a standing ovation!

Hader’s public apology seems, from reading it, more of a long argued excuse. The following, from NBCSports’ reporter Bill Baer, is Hader’s apology, “I was 17 years old, and as a child I was immature, and obviously I said some things that were inexcusable . . . I’m ready for any consequences that happen for what happened seven years ago.”

The above apology, if it can even be considered an apology, was more along the lines of a passive aggressive apology. First, Hader should have just come out straight and said something like, “I am sorry.  The things I said were obviously inexcusable. I’m willing to accept any resulting consequences for my disgusting behavior and actions.” Please notice in my hypothetical apology for Hader, I don’t use age as a way to excuse behavior. Hader needs to understand that he should allow the court of public opinion and the media to develop his age defense, not him. By him being the one to initially offer up the age excuse is to illustrate his inability but, more importantly, his unwillingness to take full actions for his behavior (for the record, a 17 year old should know not to use racist language, or homophobic language, especially on a public domain such as Twitter).

Further, Hader already has the greatest defense in sports – he is white. There are certain rights afforded to those who are “playing while white”. In David Leonard’s book, Playing While White, he talks about how the media developed Riley Cooper’s defense/redemption when Cooper, a white former Philadelphia Eagles’ wide receiver, used the N-word while drunk at a country music concert.  As Leonard noted, “[t]o redeem Cooper was to redeem white America. No wonder redemption was a guarantee. It is fundamental to playing, living, and breathing, while white.” Cooper offered his apology, and did not use intoxication as an excuse. Then Cooper’s black teammates came to his side to speak up for him, exonerating Cooper, and, in turn, exonerating the white America. As Leonard notes, “[t]he constant depiction of Cooper as a good guy being unfairly demonized, as a man who at worst made a bad choice because of too many beers and a bad temper, who was humble enough to apologize and make amends, whose good nature could be seen in the love from his black teammates made it so Cooper didn’t need to walk the pathway toward redemption. His redemption was inevitable. #MakingMistakesWhileWhite makes that always the case.”

So, when Hader took the mound, less than a week after the racist story broke, it wasn’t amazing to see a mostly white stadium give him a standing ovation. What is even worse is that Milwaukee is one of the most heavily segregated cities in America. So what this ovation illustrated was that white America desperately wanted to “redeem” itself. They wanted to quickly applaud Hader for being able to “move past and grow” from his inexcusable behavior. However, the only way this would have been a credible ovation is if the entire stadium attendees were African – American. By a mostly white crowd standing, applauding Hader, they inadvertently admit to their implied racism/bias. If America wants to claim itself to be a “post-racial” society, as many on the right claim it is, then when situations like this happen the initial and persistent reaction should be to demand accountability from the culprit. They shouldn’t have stood, they should have publicly denounced Hader, underscoring that, “at 17, in today’s society, it is not permissible to state racial slurs.” Instead, they, the white public, chose to immediately forgive Hader.

Finally, Wisconsin is a state that voted for Trump. Trump is the same man who refuses to criticize white supremacist groups, who believes in order over law, who demands that NFL players who kneel for the National Anthem be “fired.”

Trump was elected, not by a “post-racial America”, but by a seasonally dormant, yet well rooted racist society.  That racist weed emerged, for a brief moment, when that crowd stood for Hader.

 

Soccer Doesn't Suck, Penalty Kicks Do

In a moment of desperation and boredom I tuned into the World Cup. This game, or I should say, the “match” was between extremely talented Spain and extremely untalented, and host nation, Russia. The game was tied one to one when I tuned in at the 79^th minute. The game continued to be tied at the 90^th minute, which is the end of “regulation.” However, the “match” was still knotted up even after the “extra minutes” were added on (for those who may not know, “extra minutes” are determined by the amount of time, during regulation, where soccer was not being played, but the clock was running). Still, a winner was still not decided, even after “overtime” (which is two 15 minute periods of extra time). So the “match” concluded with penalty kicks, in which each team has five tries to score penalty kicks against the opposing team’s goalie. Here, Spain missed more penalty kicks than Russia and so Russia won. In the end the football match was decided in a way that was not really “football” and it felt wrong.

First it is understandable as to why the founders of soccer decided that penalty kicks must be the last alternative to how a tied match should be resolved, as the game has to end some time. Essentially Russia and Spain played most of the game without any scores occurring.  For much of the time nothing remotely competitive was going on on the field, other than Spain passing the ball to each other in the middle of the field and nowhere in the vicinity of the Russian goalie. On the other hand, Russia, it seemed, had a simple strategy – push the game to penalty kicks. In other words, Russia knew they athletically had no shot at beating Spain in the course of the traditional style of soccer.  So, Russia’s best shot at a win was by defeating Spain in penalty. In short, Russia knew it could not beat Spain at soccer, but knew it had a chance at beating Spain in a different form of competition, a form of competition not resembling soccer – penalty kicks.

My argument is that penalty kicks, to determine a victor once overtime has been exhausted, should be removed. This is because it provides an incentive for offensively inferior teams, like Russia, to put all their chips in playing only defense and no incentive to play decent offense. Further, although this was a “major” upset in soccer, it wasn’t a real upset. This is because penalty kicks remove nearly all the parameters that create the soccer identity.  Essentially penalty kicks are a different game entirely from soccer. They remove all defenses, all offense, and simply make the goalie guess which way the shooter decides to kick the ball. So while on paper it would look as though Russia bettered Spain in soccer, Russia actually played much worse than Spain in all statistical analysis of the game, except for “penalty kicks.” Penalty kicks are the equivalent to a game of “Monopoly” that has been going on for a while and both players are tied. In order to break the monopoly tie, the two real estate moguls decide to each roll one dice and whoever rolls higher wins the game. However, all reasonable minds can conclude that although rolling of the dice is a crucial part of the board game, it alone is not the game itself.

The solution is to alter the game, but keep its context still alive, so that the victor can confidently claim that they beat the other team at soccer. The most advantageous and equitable alternative would be to remove players from the field, once regulation has concluded. So there are eleven soccer players per team on the field during regulation, if the game goes to overtime, the game should be brought down to seven players on each side. Yes, this would give an advantage to the more skilled team, but the more skilled team had the same proportionate advantage as to when there were eleven players. In turn, what this does is provide those skilled players more space as to create a shot. This proposal allows the soccer game to be decided within the form and framework of soccer, rather than some other game entirely, called “penalty kicks.”  

… American football can’t come soon enough…

Ocean’s Overboard and Overdone

This past Saturday I saw the newly released film called, Ocean’s 8. It held the same premise as all the former Ocean movies, but the difference was that the criminals were all female. The movie was filled with star studded actresses, such as Sandra Bullock, Cate Blanchett, and Anne Hathaway, grabbing the headlines. Nonetheless, even with all these stars, the movie was probably the worst installment of the Ocean’s series.  Actually, what this movie resembled was the 2011 Philadelphia Eagles.

The 2011 Philadelphia Eagles were highly star studded. That year they signed 12 free agents compromised most notably of: running back Ronnie Brown, cornerback Nnamdi Asomugha, defensive tackle Cullen Jenkins and defensive end Jason Babin. However, the team finished just 8-8 and missed the playoffs.  To make matters worse, in 2011 the four newly signed players (Brown, Asomugha, Jenkins, and Babin) took up nearly a fifth of the team’s payroll. So it’s safe to say that the free agency acquisitions did not help the 2011 Philadelphia Eagles.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer ran an interesting story in 2012 called, “NFL’s track record on building teams through free agency mixed at best: Analysis,” in which it analyzed all 32 NFL teams from 2006-2011 in terms of their free agent signings and their winning percentage. Eight teams won 60 percent or more of their games in those five years. Six of those eight teams signed fewer than fifteen free agents and three of those teams signed less than five. The teams that won over 60 percent of their games and, in turn, predominantly signed few free agents, were the dynasties of the late 2000’s. These teams consisted of the Saints (28), Patriots (22), Giants (14), Steelers (11), Ravens (10), Colts (4), Chargers (4), and Packers (3). Now the teams that were crappy during this time period tended to sign free agents more readily. For instance the Lions, who had a winning percentage of 31%, signed 35 free agents (remember this includes their 0-16 season back in 2008), the Raiders, who had a winning percentage of 37%, signed 27 free agents, the Dolphins and Redskins, who both had winning percentages of 40%, signed 26 free agents a piece, and finally the Browns, who had a winning percentage of 35%, signed 21 free agents.

There are several analyses that this data shows. First, the reason why it seems good teams signed few free agents is because those teams were not in a desperation mode. For instance, the Lions signed 35 free agents in these five years and within these five years they had one year in which they did not win a game. So it shows that the team was trying to do anything to muster some sort of respectability. In other words, the mentality is different. Whereas, in the case of the Steelers, a free agent helps to subtly improve the team, like whip cream does on a slice of pie. The pie will taste just fine without the whip cream, but the whip cream might push it to become the coveted dessert at family reunions. On the other hand, losing teams are trying to build their foundation with free agents, which is a liability for reasons that will be described next.

Typically traditional free agents have already proven themselves in the NFL. They have gained some level of respectability. However, free agents also come with some level of “baggage”. This is because the free agent was not able to come to terms with their previous team, or their previous team no longer thought that the player was in their best interest (hence why his previous team didn’t re-sign him). For instance, Terrell Owens was an excellent receiver but when he signed with the Cowboys, after being released from the Eagles, it was a gamble that the Cowboys had to evaluate thoroughly. Terrell Owens is a flamboyant and argumentative person, which led to him being released by the Eagles.  Although he played well for the Cowboys, there is some evidence that he also contributed to a lot of the team’s locker room drama. So because the free agent has proven himself, he is not as easily able to be conformed to his new team’s culture, which, as the aforementioned example explains, can cause issues within the team.

Due to the fact that free agents typically have “proven themselves,” they also hold more leverage in terms of their asking price when negotiating contracts. As stated earlier, the 2011 Eagle’s signed 12 free agents. Their four top free agents took up nearly a fifth of their cap space alone.  In turn, free agents are a financial gamble. The team must weigh whether proven performance is worth more than a high premium. That is not an easy answer because sometimes the free agent’s previous team made that player “look” better than he really was. In other words, that player is a system player, and the reason he performed well wasn’t necessarily so much a result of his natural talents, but because his natural talents fit the system that that team was running. For instance, when the Houston Texans signed quarterback Brock Osweiler to a $70M fully guaranteed contract, they were expecting a franchise quarterback. However, what the Texans got was a terrible player, who looked good in Denver because he was surrounded by great talent.

So in order for a free agent to help a team succeed two elements need to be met. First, the team who is taking in a free agent must have a well-respected and proven head coach. This is because if the team has a proven-coach they have a well-established culture. So it follows, if the team has a well-established culture then (1) they know what type of players and what system works best for their needs and (2) the entire team buys into that system.  If the coach is weak or unproven, there isn’t any cohesive culture and a free agent could cause just more internal team friction, while also wasting cap space.

So coming back to the issue with Ocean’s 8, the movie lacked the culture and the foundation on which the previous three were built. The most glaring reason for this is the fact the previous Oceans’ were all directed (i.e. the head coach) by Steven Soderbergh; whereas Ocean’s 8 was directed by Gary Ross. So, Ocean’s 8 was, like the 2011 Eagles, – fine, but given its star quality investment, it should have been a lot better.

How The Golden State Gold Rush Dries Up

The NBA is a league in which a single star player can thrust a sub-par team to the playoffs. So a team with four all-stars and above average bench players not only thrusts a team into the playoffs, but at the very least, takes their team to the conference finals. The latter are the Golden State Warriors.

So then how does a team that seems perfect, fail? The easiest answers would be injury or retirement. However, the former typically does not destroy a dynasty, unless the injury is career ending or is chronic (for instance Derek Rose has never been the same since his knee injuries, even though he is still in the league), and retirement is usually foreseeable in professional sports. Also most dynasties occur when the team’s players are not nearing retirement (Michael Jordan retiring from the Bulls for the final time).  In turn, a dynasty, like the Mayans, fails from within.

Now the question becomes: How do the Golden State Warriors collapse from within?  In the simplest terms it comes down to the fact that good players, all-star players, want to win, but also want to be paid adequately. In 2017 Kevin Durant, the Warriors’ forward who was courted from Oklahoma City in order to stop Lebron and the Cavs, took a pay cut. Typically a player of his caliber should receive the max salary (~$35M per year), but Durant took about a ten million dollar pay cut, in which he netted $25M. Dan Feldman, from NBCsports.com, stated that Durant’s pay cut allowed for, “the Warriors to keep Andre Iguodala and Shaun Livingston.” However, Durant could have been paid $31M and the Warriors could still have kept Iguodala and Livingston. Feldman then mentions that the Warriors were able to sign the shooter Nick Young, with the cash saved from Durant’s pay cut. If the Warriors’ really needed Nick Young so badly that they asked Durant to take a pay cut, it seems like a slap in the face to Durant. It should be noted the addition of Nick Young was not crucial to the Warriors’ continued success. Nonetheless Durant’s pay cut is just the foreshadowing of the demise.

Steph Curry, the overrated point guard for the Warriors, is scheduled to receive a “super max” contract worth $201M through 2022. Then Klay Thompson, who is the best all-around player on the Warriors, will become a free agent in the summer of 2019. Thompson’s current contract is scheduled to be worth $68M, so it is likely that, due to his caliber and talent, that he will likely not only like to see a monetary raise to compensate his value, but also to be paid like a super star. Then in the summer of 2020, Draymond Green’s current contract, which is scheduled to be worth $82M, expires. Here,  Green will have the same dilemma as Thompson. Golden State’s ownership will have to decide whether they adequately compensate their players, and in doing so, the ownership will have to pay the tax for being over the soft cap. In other words, the ownership would be losing money.  The other option is that the ownership tries to have Durant, who will be a free agent in the summer of 2018, take another pay cut. This option seems unlikely as Feldman has stated that Durant has implied he does not think taking another pay cut would be smart.

There seems to be two options available. The first is that the Golden State Warriors’ ownership uses Durant’s willingness to take a pay cut as precedent for the rest of the team to do the same when their current contract terms expire. The issue with this is that players will only be getting older and so their bargaining power, after they take their initial “pay cut”, becomes lower. The other option is that Golden State trade one of these players – namely Green or Thompson – in the last year of their current contract. This is highly unlikely for Thompson; the reason for this is because he will just be 28 when his current contract expires, and will also be in his prime. The more likely scenario is Draymond Green is not resigned or is traded in his last year of his contract, if he is not willing to take a pay cut. Green would be about 30 or 31 when his contract expires. However, Green is not physically gifted like other all-stars and so when he reaches his 30’s his abilities may be dissipating, rather than improving, or at the very least staying the same.

In the end the Golden State Warriors’ dynasty may collapse due to cash, as stated above.  But if the team decides to all take pay cuts or the ownership pays the tax, there is one inevitable way the dynasty ends – time. A player’s physical talent is finite, and as a player ages, his abilities deteriorate, and with that, so does his value to his team.

Star Spangle Banter!

Has Barnes ‘n Noble’s stock gone up? Are piano lessons being sought after at an astronomical rate? Has Fort McHenry received an absorbent amount of attendance? The reason I ask these questions is because for some reason the National Anthem has become so idolized that the NFL has now enacted a National Anthem Policy.

The policy is relatively broad and straight forward, which for those who have delved into any policy, law, or rule, realize that a broad law/rule tends to be challenged regularly and exceptions are enacted to narrow its scope. The Policy states, according to Sport’s Illustrated’s Albert Breer, that “the league’s new policy will allow players to choose whether or not they come out for the anthem, but require them to stand for it if they’re on the field when it plays.”

So there are three issues that need to be discussed with this rule:

1.       How the new policy was passed

2.       What’s the NFL’s reason for enacting such policy

3.       What parties are hurt by this policy.

Let’s start with the first issue of how this policy was enacted. The first reports indicated that the NFL’s owners voted on whether this policy should be legislated.  It was concluded that thirty-one of the thirty-two owners voted in favor of the policy, with the lone owner (the 49ers owner) abstaining from the vote. However, as reported by ESPN.com’s Seth Wickersham, the NFL did not actually conduct a vote, but rather polled the owners. From this poll they assumed that the owners would vote in favor of this policy.

So the NFL effectively decided to end an already dying protest by an authoritarian method – shutting down a peaceful demonstration by non-peaceful means. History has shown in America the consequences of such a strategy. Martin Luther King Jr.’s Selma March would not have been the same, nor would it have been as effective, if it was not for the government (i.e. the municipal police officers) using violent means to try and quash a peaceful protest.

What is more appalling is not the fact that the NFL lied by stating that new Anthem Policy was a vote made unanimously, but rather the fact that the NFL has not learned from its past lying.  This is the same league that only a few years ago botched handling the Ray Rice incident.  In that public relations embarrassment, the league was originally going to just hand Rice a two-game suspension, but then decided against it only once it felt the general public outcry toward the horrific elevator camera footage of the violence Rice inflicted upon his wife.  From that experience, the NFL should have learned it’s always best to “measure twice and cut once.” However, here in the flag issue the NFL handed down a broad policy, and wanted the general public to believe that every club was for it, but this was not true. This is exemplified by the Jets owner coming out and saying that he would not punish (i.e. pass down the fines that the club received) any player who violated this policy.

The other issue is the fact that the NFL did not discuss this new policy with the players, prior to it being announced. Now, legally, the NFL is a private corporate entity and therefore its employees are not provided with Constitutional protections – i.e. free speech. However, I would argue that NFL stadiums and owners who beg for their stadiums to be paid by local municipalities (taxpayers) are in fact a governmental entity and therefore subject to the Constitution. Regardless, the NFL, like any professional sports league, is unique in that its labor is extremely rare. In other businesses a policy like this anthem policy would be easily enacted as the company’s labor is easily replaceable. So input from its labor is less needed as they are more likely to succumb to the demands and policies of the company’s owners for fear that they could be terminated and quickly replaced. However, the NFL is made up of extremely gifted and rare individuals who make the game what it is – entertaining. In turn, it is important for the NFL to work harmoniously with its players, because, if they have an unhappy workforce, the product on the field could suffer. The NFL failed in this respect and has strained its relationship with its players even further.

The NFL claims it enacted this policy, reported by Tadd Haislop of Sportingnews.com, out of “respect for the flag and anthem.” Anyone who believes that reasoning probably also believes that Donald Trump is the “least racist person ever!” The NFL created this rule because it thought it would boost its perception. For instance the NFL recently passed a new rule, reported by George Henry of the Chicago Tribune, “that says any player who initiates contact with his helmet is subject to ejection after an in-game video review that will be decided in New York.” This rule includes lineman. If the referees are to follow the letter of the law, then lineman will be ejected at a rapid pace. So the rule will not be enforced, but just used to give the average fan a “perception” that the NFL is trying to make the game safer.

The same principle of “perception” is used with the National Anthem Policy. The NFL believed this would make them look more patriotic, so fans would feel that the NFL is “All about America.” The NFL really is trying to mitigate any “bad” press (largely stemming from the President). What the NFL really did was pour gasoline onto a dying fire, enrage its players, and preach “patriotism” through authoritarian means of enforcement. The irony is everywhere.